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Abstract
New sources for ancillary services are needed, yet
the requirements for service provision in most countries
are explicitly formulated for traditional generators. This
leads to waste of the potential for new technologies to de-
liver ancillary services. In order to harness this potential,
we propose to parameterize the requirements of ancillary
services so that reserves can be built by combining the
advantageous properties of different technologies. The
proposal is exemplified through a laboratory test where
it shown that the system needs can be covered through
cheaper and smaller reserves.
1. Introduction
Ancillary services (AS) are essential for the reliable op-
eration of power systems. In some countries, the high
penetration of renewable energy sources is leading to the
decommissioning of traditional generators, thus reduc-
ing the available resources for AS provision [1]. With
the increase in adoption of distributed energy resources
(DERs) and controllable smart loads, as well as the emer-
gence of schemes for utilizing consumption flexibility,
such as demand response (DR), new sources for AS from
the demand-side are potentially available.
Demand-side resources (DSRs) possess qualities that
in many cases match the performance needs of the sys-
tem better than traditional generators [2], yet the require-
ments for AS in many countries are defined on the im-
plicit assumption that only generators provide ancillary
services. Therefore, these requirements can be a bar-
rier for the participation of DSRs in the AS markets [3].
There are both economic and technical benefits in ex-
ploiting the qualities of flexible demand.
This work parametrizes the requirements for re-
sources providing AS such that the reserve can be sized
optimally to the overall system requirements. The over-
all system requirements are also redefined in terms
of a desired shape instead of a capacity. The new
parametrized requirements are focused on service per-
formance and are source/technology independent. By
changing the AS requirements to focus on performance
rather than unit capabilities and utilizing new technolo-
gies as AS sources, system operators may increase sys-
Figure 1: System frequency following a generation
contingency event.
tem reliability [4], reduce the size and cost of the reserve,
and increase participation in the AS markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 reviews the current state of power system opera-
tion, ancillary service definitions and requirements; Sec-
tion 3 presents the problems and opportunities we ad-
dress. Section 4 formulates new AS requirements and an
exemplary AS market clearing setup; Section 5 presents
a case study of the impact of the new requirements, and
section 6 presents conclusions and future research paths.
2. Ancillary Services from Demand Re-
sponse
In electric power systems, supply and demand must be
kept balanced at all times while respecting network lim-
itations and operational constraints. For unanticipated
imbalances, system operators procure specific Ancillary
Services as operating reserves to respond when these im-
balances manifest. A common metric used to indicate
imbalance in a power system is the system frequency.
Figure 1 illustrates an imbalance, possibly the result
of a contingency event like a generator unexpectedly go-
ing off-line, and the resulting frequency time series as
the system responds with its ancillary services.
2.1. Power system operation and ancillary ser-
vices
In Figure 1, a contingency event occurs which causes
the system frequency to fall. Operating reserves begin
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Figure 2: Reserves have traditionally been sized using offline studies of frequency response (both nadir and
settling frequency) to N-1 contingencies.
to respond to arrest the frequency excursion and then re-
turn system frequency to its nominal value. While the
structure of ancillary services differs between systems,
generally there are the following three categories of re-
sponse, matching the AS framework presented in [5].
Primary reserves, also called frequency droop con-
trol, and in ENTSO-E terms ‘Frequency Containment Re-
serves’ [6], are the first and fastest with a response time
in seconds. Primary reserves are resources controlled
locally, responding directly to local measurements of
the system frequency. They arrest the falling frequency
and begin to restore it towards a settling frequency corre-
sponding to the physical imbalance.
Secondary reserves, also called ‘regulation’ or ‘area
control’ (in ENTSO-E terms ‘Frequency Restoration Re-
serves’) operate in the seconds to minutes time frame.
These reserves are activated via a communication based
(centralized) control scheme to release active primary re-
serves and to return the frequency to its nominal value,
respectively re-balance the .
Finally, tertiary reserves are slower, often manually
activated resources, also called ‘load following’ in US;
in ENTSO-E terms ‘Replacement Reserves’. These re-
serves are employed to return the system back to a stable
state and restore the fast acting reserves while converging
back to the nominal system frequency.
Secondary reserves, and in some places also primary
reserves, are procured through market mechanisms on
a daily basis. The quantity of reserves that a system
operator will procure is based on a pre-defined reserve
requirement that should provide adequate response ca-
pability for any possible single contingency event in a
system [7, 8]. The work presented here explores an alter-
nate reserve requirement definition based on the shape
of system response needs and presents a procurement
mechanism to limit the over-provision of reserves.
2.2. Service requirements and limitations
Until now, system operators have been able to arrest fre-
quency excursions fast enough because of the inherent
system inertia. But as the inertia decreases, system op-
erators require faster response times from primary fre-
quency control (as illustrated in Figure 1).
The system operator must have sufficient primary re-
serves to arrest the frequency as fast as possible, before
the system enters a state where a blackout is inevitable.
A metric for the sufficiency of procured reserves is the
frequency nadir [9], illustrated in Figure 1, and it is de-
sirable to keep it as close to the settling frequency as
possible. Similarly, the system operator ensures that the
secondary reserves act as fast as possible to relieve the
primary reserves and also bring the frequency from the
settling frequency back to the nominal frequency.
Because AS are essential for the secure operation of
the system, the system operators also have requirements
and restrictions on the units providing AS. A super-set of
requirements across different systems has been identified
in [5]. Most service requirements are oriented towards
the least common denominator of service providers, e.g.
a unit providing primary frequency control in Denmark
should provide half of the service within 15 seconds, full
response within 30 seconds, and sustain it for 15 min-
utes [10]. A system operator acquires a reserve based
upon the assumption that all units have the same mini-
mum characteristics. We illustrate this in Figure 2, where
the left most block is a geometrical representation of
the response characteristics (ramp rate, duration of re-
sponse and volume) of, e.g., a single synchronous gener-
ator. The contracted reserve is a stacking of the assumed
responses of the units, which must satisfy the reserve
requirement. Traditionally, this dimensioning has been
done based upon a desired settling frequency, frequency
nadir and the n-1 criteria. Figure 2 shows that the reserve
must be over-dimensioned (in terms of volume) if the
stacked response is to fulfill the ramping requirements
that ensure an acceptable frequency nadir.
In short, the historical definition for service require-
ments has an implicit bias for traditional resources. Al-
ternative technologies are restricted in their contribution
to AS provision and their favorable properties are not
utilized or undervalued.
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Figure 3: System operators can secure reserves by procuring them based upon mixed resources capabilities.
3. Problem Statement
Although DSRs provide additional freedom to help shape
response compared to traditional AS providers, the exist-
ing AS market rules and requirements are a strong barrier
to DSR market participation. A recent study identifies
such barriers in the US [3]. The rules and requirements
that limit resource participation in different markets are
not consistent among different RTOs and ISOs; however,
the authors identify three major groups of these rules:
rules on the size of the resource, rules on the measure-
ment and telemetry of the resource, and rules on market
bidding time. Out of six different ISOs and RTOs in the
US, only one allows load aggregation to provide regula-
tion services, and only two allow aggregation participa-
tion as a spinning reserve provider. Furthermore, only
two ISOs and RTOs allow aggregate telemetry. Provid-
ing telemetry at an individual resource level increases
the overall cost of metering, making it challenging for
DSRs to provide cost-competitive AS.
Similarly, [11] shows the current status of the regula-
tory condition for DR in Europe. It states that, although
great advances have been made towards opening the mar-
kets to DR, there are still many regulatory barriers. The
report classifies these barriers in four groups: 1) demand
response access to market, 2) service provider access to
market, 3) product requirements, and 4) measurement
and verification, payments and penalties.
The ideal resource to satisfy the system need is one
which (1) is always available, and (2) always capability
exceeds the ramp rate, power capacity and energy loss
of all the resources for which it must compensate. In
principle, load is an ideal resource since (1) the load is
always present, and (2) it is always greater than or equal
to the supply that might be lost.
In [12] it is shown that if primary frequency response
is provided by demand response (with a very fast re-
sponse), the frequency nadir occurs at higher frequen-
cies. In [13], the authors argue that the value of reg-
ulation resources can be defined based upon the ramp
capabilities of the service providing units. Following the
conclusions presented in [12, 13], an optimal utilization
of demand-side resource technologies for AS delivery
could lead to arresting frequency excursions at higher
frequency nadir, thus lessening the required amount of
supply-side reserves, and thus overall a lower system op-
eration cost.
From an economics point of view, two methods can
be utilized to include and incentivize the participation of
technologies that in some respects are closer to the ideal
than those defined by the current service and market re-
quirements: product differentiation and product restruc-
turing.
Some transmission system operators, like PJM, have
implemented the FERC pay-for-performance require-
ment by differentiating their regulation AS into two prod-
ucts, RegA and RegD [14], splitting their regulation mar-
ket into a slow service product and a fast service product.
This work explores the alternative: restructuring the
market so that all technologies can participate in the
same market, and the system operator can optimize
the use of the resources based upon their capabilities.
This entails reformulating the performance requirements,
and removing the requirements that implicitly assume
that the services are provided by traditional generators,
thus making the requirements technology-agnostic. This
would lead to a reserve procurement as shown in Fig-
ure 3.
4. Restructuring the Ancillary Service Re-
quirements
A stated previously, our objective in this paper is to dis-
cuss and formulate requirements for AS in a number of
relevant features, and to provide a market clearing mech-
anism that selects a portfolio of resources limiting over-
provision of reserves. In order to do this, we propose that
the market mechanism operates in a resource-agnostic
and performance-oriented way. By doing so, we propose
a strategy in which (i) we remove the barriers preventing
unconventional resources from participating in AS mar-
kets due to the static nature of AS market definitions and
requirements, and (ii) we provide a fair and performance-
based market clearing structure in which the unused po-
tential of DSRs (and other technologies) is utilized.
4.1. Overall approach
The proposed restructuring assumes that system opera-
tors acquire AS reserves through a market, and that po-
tential AS providers bid their reserve capacity in that
market. The restructuring is based on the following four
key concepts (which are further developed in this sec-
tion):
• The formulation of an ideal ancillary service re-
serve that the system operator desires for the sys-
tem will depend strongly on system needs, e.g. a
reserve with very fast response in case of low sys-
tem inertia, and will be submitted as a tender offer
to the market.
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• The parameterization of the AS bids, where the pa-
rameters reflect the service providers’ ability to per-
form as an ideal reserve, removes the minimum-
requirements-barriers on new technologies, thus en-
abling any potential useful unit to participate in the
AS provision, which facilitates market liquidity and
reduces overall costs of acquiring and calling on
needed resources.
• Clearing all units under a generalized single
clearing-price auction provides incentives to bid
actual marginal cost. In this auction, the capability
value of each service provider, their availability and
their historical performance is taken into account.
• Performance-based remuneration creates an incen-
tive to provide better AS resources and enables
transparent performance-based clearing of the mar-
ket.
Based on an assessment of the complete decision pro-
cess, we merge the four key concepts outlined before into
a novel approach to AS valuation that accounts both for
resource performance and the actual spectrum of system
needs. The holistic assessment includes:
• Planning: Parameterization of resource perfor-
mance and specification of tender conditions based
on the assessment of system needs;
• Scheduling: Quantification of AS tender volume,
AS bid submission, and market clearing;
• Operation: Monitoring the performances of reserve
dispatch/activation based on the traditional defini-
tions related to frequency excursions; and
• Settlement: Verification of service delivery and re-
muneration.
Our proposal focuses on a new parametrization of
services (Sec. 4.3), which affects in particular market
clearing (Sec. 4.4) and remuneration (Sec. 4.6).
4.2. Ideal service tender
In existing AS, there is an implicit assumption that ideal
unit response corresponds to a scalar fraction of the re-
quired system response (see Sec. 2.2). Therefore, a fast
response of individual units is required. In the pres-
ence of a diverse resource portfolio, a better system re-
sponse can be achieved, e.g. by combination of a fast
duration-limited and slower unlimited response time re-
sources. The fast responding units become part of an
overall cheaper mixed portfolio, which delivers a better
system response.
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Figure 4: The ideal ramp response is determined
mainly by system inertia and sustained until sec-
ondary frequency control is activated.
For example, a system operator could determine that
the ideal system response to a frequency excursion is the
one that has a resulting frequency nadir at the settling
frequency (thus minimizing the risk of tripping the under-
frequency relays). Based upon the inertia of the system,
the system operator determines the volume (Vtot) needed
as well as the response characteristics needed to achieve
this, see Figure 4.
4.3. Parametrization of service performance
Today, AS requirements are not differentiated accord-
ing to the capabilities of the unit providing the service.
Therefore, service definitions are designed to accommo-
date the least capable unit in the portfolio. As a conse-
quence, more capable units are not being fully utilized,
leading to excess contracting of service providers.
This sub-optimal allocation of resources could be ad-
dressed by introducing a performance dependent defini-
tion of AS, i.e., a service definition that allows compli-
ance to be measured on a linear rather than a binary scale:
In addition to compliance and noncompliance, different
levels of partial compliance are possible. In this context,
services will be defined such that the best possible per-
formance of the most capable unit corresponds to full
compliance.
One of the challenges with such an approach is to
achieve a useful definition of partial compliance. De-
pending on the complexity of the service, many parame-
ters of DR resources may have to be included in a perfor-
mance comparison to determine their relative value. For
example, resources with identical response magnitudes,
ramp rates and duration may represent a significantly
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different value to the buyer of a cyclic service if one re-
source requires a longer recovery time between cycles
than the other. A performance model is therefore needed
to provide a mapping between the multidimensional pa-
rameter space of a DR resource and the degree to which
it fully satisfies the needs of the TSO, expressed on a
linear scale.
We introduce the following definition of a capability
value:
κi = g(x) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where g is a functional mapping the parameter space
x to a scalar value according to resource utility. This
mapping function is highly specific to a particular service
and must therefore be developed with care by the service
requester; e.g., a TSO, in order to avoid units with certain
capabilities gaining too much market power.
The functional g is communicated to the resources as
part of the service definition included in a tender. The
scalar value κ for a particular resource can then be calcu-
lated by its operator prior to bidding.
4.4. Market mechanism
The market mechanism progresses as follows: the TSO
identifies a tender request Ttot = f(x), where f maps
the parameter space x to the desires reserve require-
ments, and the mapping g of the individual bid to κi
is announced for market participants. The tender request
can be mapped to a piecewise linear response function
VTSO that is depicted by the red line in Figure 3.
The TSO transforms the market participants’ bids
into a similar piecewise linear response function:
Vi(t) = h(x), (2)
where h is a function that maps the parameter space to
the piecewise linear response. The stacking of all Vi(t)
must fulfill the reserve requirement VTSO:∑
i∈Ωacc
Vi ≥ VTSO, (3)
where Ωacc is the pool of accepted bids.
In order to leverage the proposed AS restructuring,
the market clearing mechanism needs to be adapted.
One option is to take the capability value of the service
providers, κi, a historical service performance index, γi,
and a unit reliability index, i, into account. There are
many different ways of formulating such a market clear-
ing mechanism. We present an example of a market that
utilizes the service parameterization to form an ideal ser-
vice response at the end of this section.
4.5. Reserve activation and operation
The specification of tender and bid parameterization
needs to be aligned with the activation mechanism ap-
plied during real-time operation of the resource dispatch
and activation. For example, fast activation upon detec-
tion of frequency excursion is important for primary fre-
quency response, so the units or aggregators coordinating
the DSRs should have instrumentation capable of quickly
detecting these excursions and actuating the required re-
sponse.
The use of frequency responsive load was demon-
strated in the Olympic Peninsula project [15]. The
project showed that very fast load response to under-
frequency events was consistent and effective both at the
unit level and in the aggregate. However, the demon-
stration did not address the question of how many or
which loads should be sensitive to frequency. Using
the proposed mechanism would permit a TSO to use
a market to identify, select and dispatch the required
number of frequency-sensitive loads to satisfy the sys-
tem needs at the lowest cost, without risking a potential
over-response from too many loads curtailing during an
under-frequency event and settling to a frequency too
high to activate the needed secondary reserve response.
4.6. Performance-based remuneration
Performance-based remuneration has already been in-
troduced in United States through the FERC Order 755.
Similarly, in this work we propose that service providers
are paid according to how close they follow the capa-
bility parameters they bid to the market when cleared.
The estimation of the service provision performance can
be done in different ways, depending on which param-
eters the system operator deems to be the most critical.
A service performance index is proposed in [16], where
service performance is defined as the root mean square
error of the actual service delivery compared to an ideal
service model:
η =
√∑N
t=0
(
QoSt
2
)
N
, (4)
η ∈ [0, 1], (5)
where N is the time horizon over which the service is de-
livered and QoS ∈ [0, 1] is the Quality of Service of the
ancillary service. The QoS is the error in service deliv-
ery scaled to the tolerance limits defined by the system
operator. When η = 0 the service has been delivered
perfectly, and when η = 1, the service delivery is barely
acceptable.
Similarly, the reliability parameter defined in the mar-
ket mechanism can be derived from an average of histor-
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ical values of the performance metric:
γ = 1−
∑H
h=1 ηh
H
, (6)
where H is a historical horizon.
4.7. Example of requirements restructuring
In this section we present a concrete example of the pro-
posed restructuring. It must be noted that it is a simple
example, and a parameterization with complex polytopes
and corresponding market clearing is envisioned as fu-
ture work. This example is also used for the case study
in Section 5.
4.7.1 Parameterization of service performance
The capability value of a unit is defined through the fol-
lowing parametrization:
κi = g(τ
r
i , τ
d
i , Ci) ∈ [0, 1] (7)
In the remainder of the paper we define τ ri as the ramp
time, τdi as the total duration the unit can sustain the
service provision and Ci as the power capacity the unit i
bids.
4.7.2 Market mechanism
The reserve requirement is defined as Ttot =
f(τ rtot, τ
d
tot, Ctot). More specifically, for any set of
(τ ri ,τ
d
i ,Ci) values the response function Vi(t) is a piece-
wise linear function and has the following form:
Vi(t) =

Ci
τri
t if 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ri
Ci if τ ri ≤ t ≤ τdi
0 elsewhere
(8)
where t is duration.
Using the above equation, a convex 2-D polyhedra Pi
that is bounded by V (i), unit duration τdi , and Vi(t) ≥ 0
could be constructed as follows:
Pi = {x ∈ R2|Aix ≤ bi} (9)
where x is defined as the vector [t, V ] and, Ai and bi has
the following forms:
Ai =

0 1
−Ciτri 1
1 0
0 −1
 bi =

Ci
0
τdi
0
 (10)
Market participants respond to the tender request
with a bid that consists of: capacity Ci [kW], bid price
P bidi [$/MW], ramp time τ
r
i [s], duration τ
d
i [s] and ca-
pability value κi; where i denotes the individual bid of
each market participant.
The TSO constructs the individual volume Vi bid by
each market participant and the Vis get adjusted by a
reliability parameter γi. γi depends on historical per-
formance of the participating unit. If a unit’s error in
availability (i) is less than a limit, the unit is eligible
for participation. The exemplary market is designed as
a single clearing price auction, in which each resources’
volume get adjusted by a reliability parameter γi, and
the clearing price P cleari gets adjusted by the capability
value κi. This ensures that the expectation from individ-
ual resources is adjusted by its historical average perfor-
mance, and the total market clearing cost includes the
capability value of each resource.
The clearing mechanism identifies a common clear-
ing price based on the most expensive accepted bid, sim-
ilar to a merit order clearing. Based on the clearing price,
the mechanism selects the subset of bids which offer
the cheapest overall clearing cost and meet the tender
requirements:
Ωacc = arg min
Ω∈Ωrec
∑
i∈Ω
κiP
clear (11)
s.t.Vadjusted =
∑
i∈Ωacc
γiVi (12)
Ptot ⊆ Padjusted (13)
P clear = maxP bidi ,∀i ∈ Ωacc (14)
i ≤ max (15)
where Ωacc and Ωrec is the set of accepted and received
bids, respectively. Ptot refers to the polyhedra that is
created by the TSO’s tender request, and Padjusted refers
to the polyhedra created by the sum of all units i that are
in Ω.
4.7.3 Remuneration
As previously mentioned, remuneration could take per-
formance and capability values into account. An exam-
ple of a final settlement price can be defined as:
P remi = (1− ηi)κiP clearCi, ∀i ∈ Ωacc, (16)
which means that each accepted bid gets remunerated
the clearing price times the delivered capacity, scaled by
the capability value and how close they perform to the
promised capability.
5. Case Study: Primary Frequency Control
In the case study we show the proposed restructuring
of the requirements through an example of primary fre-
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Figure 5: Interactions between system components (time advances down the vertical axis).
quency control. The case uses the example parameteri-
zation and market definition presented in Section 4.
Also, in this case the capability value κ the TSO as-
signs to the units is:
κ = α1
τr,0
max(τr,0, τr,a)
+ α2
min(τd,0, τd,a)
τd,0
(17)
∑
i
αi = 1 (18)
where τr,0 is the ideal ramp time the TSO desires of the
unit and τr,a is what the unit can actually deliver. Simi-
larly, τd,0 is the ideal delivery duration the TSO desires
and τd,a is what the unit can deliver. The minimum and
maximum functions ensure that units are not overvalued
in case they parameters are better than the ideal. In this
study case, τd and τr are valued equally, which means
that α1 = α2 = 0.5.
5.1. System setup
The viability of the proposed market clearing mechanism
has been tested through a proof-of-concept study based
on an experimental implementation.
The experiment assumes the existence of a market
for primary frequency response in which the TSO acts
indirectly as a single buyer of services. Based on a calcu-
lation of the system need for primary frequency response,
the TSO provides a minimum capacity envelope to the
market for which the clearing algorithm computes the
cost-optimal stacking of resources as described above.
The market result is a list of resources to activate, where
the most expensive unit sets the clearing price. Each ac-
tivated resource then continuously provides the service
by counteracting frequency excursions until the end of
the contracted operating period.
A number of simplifying assumptions have been
made for the experiment, without loss of generality. All
resources, load as well as generation, are assumed to in-
teract with the market through a single aggregator. The
grid is assumed to consist of a single control area over-
seen by one TSO. No strategic bidding is implemented
by the individual resources; base prices remain static.
Nevertheless, market results change between operational
periods due to the influence of performance evaluations
for the individual units.
The operational timeline can be seen in Figure 5.
Shortly before the end of each operational period, the
market clears for the upcoming period, and the result
is distributed to the aggregator which in turn activates
the resources with winning bids. During the operational
period, each activated resource provides the service au-
tonomously, based on a local frequency measurement.
The power consumption of each resource is continuously
measured and the data forwarded to a performance evalu-
ation module. Shortly before the end of each operational
period, the performance evaluation result is provided to
the market algorithm which clears for the next period,
completing the cycle.
The experiment was conducted at the SYSLAB labo-
ratory at DTU Risø Campus [17] which features a large
variety of DER units coupled to a 16-busbar 400V grid.
The laboratory has a high degree of automation and facil-
itates the deployment of distributed control software for
cyber-physical experiments in the smart grid domain.
For the experiment, the power system was configured
as an island grid, with a 125 kVA Static Frequency Con-
verter (SFC) serving as the grid forming unit. The droop
setting of the converter was adjusted to simulate a prede-
termined frequency response to changes in generation or
load.
In order to simplify the experiment, only two physi-
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cal DER resources were connected to the grid: An 80 kW
load bank to represent all consumption and a 15 kW re-
dox flow battery to represent all generation. Because the
behaviour of the market cannot be studied with such a
low number of participants, virtual resources were imple-
mented as real-time simulation processes, each of which
would provide an independent frequency response ser-
vice, responding to measurements of the physical grid
frequency conducted every 100 ms. The load bank and
the battery were then used to imprint the aggregate power
flow of all virtual units onto the physical grid.
Figure 6 shows the entire setup and information flow
of the experiment, divided into five layers. The two bot-
tom layers represent the physical setup of the laboratory
grid and the DER units used by the experiment. At the
third layer, DER component simulators operate based on
market input and real-time grid data. The simulation out-
put is then mapped to the physical DER units (i.e. the
load bank and the battery). The layer above performs
aggregation and evaluation of performance data and dis-
tribution of market results, interacting directly with the
market layer at the top.
5.2. Experiment description
A set of eight fictitious market participants—three gener-
ators and five loads—was generated as given in Table 1.
At the start of the experiment, a net load of 17 kW had
been established as the steady-state baseline, resul´ting
from the superposition of 27 kW of consumption and
10 kW of generation. The droop characteristics of the
back-to-back converter had been adjusted to provide an
output frequency of 50 Hz at this load point. Additional
generation and consumption capacity is used to obtain
a symmetrical reserve assignment of ±27 kW such that
44 kW of consumption causes the converter output to
drop to 48 Hz, while 10 kW of generation raises it to
52 Hz. Additional loads in the physical grid are used to
introduce step disturbances during the experiment.
The system need Vtot was characterized by τ rtot = 6
seconds, τdtot = 60 seconds, and Ctot = 12 kW. Dur-
ing the experiment, the market cleared every 60 seconds
with the same eight participants. The clearing is done
through an exhaustive search that tests all possible ser-
vice provider combinations to form the cheapest reserve.
In the period between clearings, step disturbances
were applied to the physical grid, in order to determine
the reaction of individual market participants. η and γ
were continuously calculated for each participant in order
to see the impact of performance based adjustments in
(12) on market clearing results.
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Figure 8: Response to a 10 kW disturbance.
5.3. Results
In Figure 7, we present the results of an example run of
the new market clearing mechanism and compare it with
a traditional merit order approach as used in the Nordic
System for the Manual Regulating Power Market. This
approach consists of creating a list of all received bids
(which pass the minimum requirements) sorted by the
cheapest price first, and then accepting bids sequentially
until the required capacity is acquired.
It is clear that both mechanisms select sets of partici-
pants that can satisfy the system need. Since some units
that are cleared by the new methodology (e.g., Bidder
2/Bid:5/P7) do not satisfy the requirements imposed by
traditional merit order approach, it is possible to see that
the merit order results in a set with higher capacity and
longer duration than needed. In this case, the total capac-
ity cost for the new market clearing mechanism is 30%
less than the merit-order case. Note that, the merit-order
solution is in the solution space of the new market clear-
ing methodology. However, due to relaxed requirements,
a less costly option is available in this case.
To demonstrate the response and frequency arrest ca-
pability of the selected resources we introduced a 10 kW
load increase as shown in Figure 8. As it can be seen in
the frequency behavior in Figure 8, the units that have
been selected have successfully responded to the distur-
bance and arrested the frequency at 49.5 Hz. Note that,
the back-to-back converter does not have an inertia, and
the response from units results in a new frequency equi-
librium. It must also be noted that clearing the market
through an exhaustive search does not scale, and the mar-
ket formulation might need adjustment in order to be
cleared by scalable algorithms.
6. Conclusion
This work introduces the key concept of parameteriz-
ing ancillary services (AS) requirements, so that these
8
Figure 6: Overview of the experiment setup.
Table 1: Market players and their respective assets. The quoted price is only indicative of the relative cost
between the units.
Unit Owner Resource type Baseline Capacity Ramp time Duration Price
P1 Bidder 1 load 5 kW 5 kW 3 s 120 s 8 X/kW
P2 Bidder 1 load 6 kW 4 kW 4 s 80 s 9 X/kW
P3 Bidder 2 generation 3 kW 2 kW 2 s 40 s 10 X/kW
P4 Bidder 2 generation 3 kW 2 kW 3 s 60 s 11 X/kW
P5 Bidder 2 load 5 kW 4 kW 4 s 20 s 12 X/kW
P6 Bidder 2 load 6 kW 4 kW 1 s 110 s 13 X/kW
P7 Bidder 2 generation 4 kW 1 kW 3 s 130 s 14 X/kW
P8 Bidder 2 load 5 kW 5 kW 1 s 180 s 15 X/kW
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Figure 7: Comparison of merit order approach (left) with new market clearing mechanism ∀γ = 1 (right).
become a multi-dimensional product. By doing this,
TSO/RTOs can assign a value to different technologies
depending on how they contribute to needed system re-
serves, e.g., a very slow ramping unit that can sustain a
response over long duration can complement a fast ramp-
ing unit with short duration. Since both units contribute
equally to the reserve, yet along different product param-
eters, they may have similar capability value towards the
TSO.
The case study carried out in the laboratory showed
that the proposed restructuring can lower the cost of ac-
quiring and activating reserves. As the amount of in-
termittent renewable energy production increases in the
power system, TSOs must find new ways of keeping a
balanced and reliable grid. The capability value and the
service parameterization presented in this work can be
9
used by the TSOs to form reserves that utilize the bene-
fits and synergies of different technologies, and thereby
better address the new operational requirements of the
power system.
Future work includes exploring alternative market
formulations, larger simulation studies, e.g. using the
WECC 2024 base case, the optimization of the clearing
algorithm to improve scalability and a more thorough
comparison of the proposed solution with existing mar-
ket mechanisms and product/service definitions.
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